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Beneficiary of Global Trade Liberalization 
One of the most important developments in the 
second half of the 20th century, especially after the 
Second World War, has been the rapid and extensive 
internationalization of economic activity. This has 
been most marked by the rapid growth of 
transnational corporations (TNCs), along with 
increase in trade and foreign direct investment.1 The 
TNCs play an important role in the development and 
use of natural resources, transfer of technology, 
mobilization of financial resources and the 
industrialization process in countries around the 
world. Everyone is affected by activities of the TNCs. 
In supermarkets, chain stores or village shops in every 
corner of the globe, it is their products that dominate 
the world. The global firms directly and indirectly 
control the lives and livelihood of people, ranging 
from people who live near or work in their factories, 
to the farmer who buys their seeds and fertilizers and 
sell their produce to the agricultural firms.2 
Since 1970s, the process of globalization and 
increased trade has accelerated the domination by 
TNCs over the lives of people around the world.3 The 
globalization has turned a country into the market-
based economy where the market has a significant 
influence over the government and where the state has 
lost its regulatory power and control of business and 
the market. International trade rules brought about by 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) and bilateral 
and regional Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) are 
based on a process of exchange embodying minimum 
standards of treatment. The government is prohibited 
from interfering with private economic activities, and 
is required to remove its policies that affect cross-
border trade. For example, the European Union has 
been negotiating a free trade agreement with India. 
The successful negotiations will make India 
substantially reduced its tariffs of 150% levied on 
imported whisky.4 The tariff reduction will likely 
increase alcohol imports and consumption in India but 
undermine public health policy goals the country 
intends to achieve. 
Developed nations can force the negative 
consequences of their domestic policies on another 
through the multilateral rule-making process of the 
WTO and, in specific areas the World Intellectual 
Property Organisation (WIPO) and others. The 
international economic order established through the 
multilateral process has brought substantial economic 
benefits to industrialized nations. For example, it was 
estimated that if the WTO/TRIPS obligations for 
intellectual property (IP) protection were fully 
implemented, annual transfers of funds to major 
technology-exporting countries in the form of 
royalties and licensing fees would increase to more 
than US$ 20 billion.5 This clearly reflects that 
developed economies stand to make significant gains 
from open trade more than developing countries. 
—————— 
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The trade liberalization leads to a significant 
decline in the capacity of the nation-state to regulate 
in the public interest.6 Various trade agreements are 
generally negotiated by governments’ politicians and 
bureaucrats but represent the demands of the TNCs. 
The multilateral agreements, through the WTO, 
covers a broad range of areas and topics, including 
trade in goods and services, investment, government 
procurement, labour and environmental standards, and 
protection of IP rights. While trade negotiations are 
focused on establishing a set of rules to protect 
corporate interests, they do not address the public 
concerns in regards to the protection of environment, 
human rights, public health and safety, etc. Domestic 
laws and government measures aimed to protect and 
promote the public interest are generally considered 
barriers to trade, which must be eliminated or 
decreased. In addition, governments around the world 
have been required to implement laws that provide 
high level of protection for corporate-owned IP rights. 
The successful lobbying campaign of US 
pharmaceutical industry to impose on other countries, 
through trade negotiations and/or unilateral trade 
sanctions, a strict patent regime for pharmaceuticals 
that has a profoundly negative impact on the access to 
medicines of people is a case in point.7 
In the late 1980s, a number of countries, including 
Taiwan, Korea, India, Thailand and Indonesia, were 
placed under tremendous pressure by the world’s 
largest trading bloc led by the United States whom 
they were unable to withstand. The developed 
economies exerted bilateral pressure, by withdrawing 
or threatening to withdraw trade privileges they gave 
to developing countries under the Generalized System 
of Preferences (GSP). The developed countries also 
threatened to impose trade sanctions on the countries 
that failed to provide adequate and effective IP 
protection. Because of this pressure, those developing 
countries decided to revise their IP laws even before 
the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations 
was concluded. 
When a country’s government has decided that it 
wishes to apply for membership of WTO, it has to 
make a large number of commitments. Accession to 
the WTO involves a complex technical process and 
negotiations with existing members. The country has 
to adopt domestic laws and regulations to implement 
WTO obligations, even before the final accession 
terms and commitments are presented to the WTO 
body for a vote. Most developing countries face 
special difficulties in completing their accession 
process.8 The case of Vietnam’s bid for accession to 
the WTO is a good example of the challenges a 
developing country faces when it seeks to become a 
WTO member. 
Prior to becoming a member of the WTO in 2007, 
Vietnam foresaw the benefit of becoming a member, 
in terms of a chance to enjoy the MFN treatment, 
access to the dispute settlement mechanism, and 
establishment of a suitable investment climate that 
attracts TNCs. During the accession process, Vietnam 
was under great pressure to accept all sorts of 
commitments. It had to enter separate bilateral 
negotiations with some key WTO members, such as 
the European Union, the United States, Australia and 
Japan. Those countries had put in a request for a 
number of concessions from Vietnam in exchange 
with their support for its application. For example, 
Vietnam was asked not to use the safeguard 
provisions on agricultural goods in case when there 
was an import surge that may undermine the domestic 
market. It was required to provide patent protection 
for pharmaceuticals, and to expand copyright 
protection to audio-visuals, prior to its WTO 
accession. It was pressured to make available IP 
protection that is not required by the WTO/TRIPS 
Agreement, such as providing data exclusivity (i.e. 
protection of clinical trial data, submitted with a new 
drug application, against use by either drug regulatory 
authorities or other companies). Some WTO member 
requested Vietnam to provide them with draft 
legislation on protection of geographical indications. 
Some countries required Vietnam to join the Patent 
Co-operation Treaty (PCT) in exchange for their 
support for Vietnam’s accession.9 
Apart from the multilateral level, bilateral and 
regional trade deals can restrict a country’s ability to 
use the relevant policy space to implement its national 
development policies. In recent times, the United 
States and the European Union have launched their 
negotiation campaigns for an FTA with certain 
countries. The countries that have signed or are in the 
process of negotiation of a bilateral and regional trade 
agreements with two of the world’s economic 
superpowers include Australia, the Andean 
Community countries, Bahrain, the Central American 
countries, Chile, India, Jordan, Morocco, Panama, 
Singapore, Southern African countries, Thailand, 
Vietnam, etc. Larger economies like China and Japan 
are also engaged in negotiating free trade agreements 
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with their trading partners. China, the world’s second 
largest economy, is working toward an FTA with 
ASEAN (called ASEAN+3). Japan has so far 
concluded an FTA with Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Negotiations 
for an FTA are also underway among Australia, 
Chile, India, Japan and South Korea. 
One of the most significant free trade agreements is 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement. The 
TPP Agreement is currently being negotiated by 12 
nations, including Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, 
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, 
Singapore, the United States and Vietnam. It is 
expected to be concluded by the end of 2014. When 
concluded, the TPP Agreement will tie together the 
Pacific’s largest economies and will set standards of 
trade measures that cover a broad range of traditional 
and non-traditional trade and investment issues, such 
as local-content requirements in government contracts, 
higher standards of IP protection, the roles of state 
enterprises, liberalization of telecommunications, 
labour and environment standards and e-commerce. 
The TPP Agreement is expected to be the world’s 
highest standard agreement and perhaps will become 
the most important trade agreement in the 21st century. 
Due to its rule that allows for membership expansion, 
the Agreement will create the largest and most 
important trading bloc which includes many of the 
Pacific’s largest economies such as, the United States, 
Japan, Canada, Australia, Singapore and perhaps China. 
From the perspective of the negotiating countries, 
the signing of non-multilateral trade agreements is the 
crucial economic factor for creating growth, 
efficiency and stability in their economy. A unified 
and borderless economic entity will present greater 
business challenges and opportunities for enterprises 
and investors of the signatory countries. It will also 
give exporters and investors from those countries 
greater access to lucrative integrated markets. 
However, it has been argued that the benefits derived 
from the trade agreements seems unbalanced, due to 
the fact that such agreements are negotiated by parties 
of unequal bargaining power. The power asymmetry 
is likely to influence the bargaining outcomes and will 
lead to unequal distribution of benefits causing 
unfairness and inequity in trading relations.10 
 
International Intellectual Property Protection and 
Trade Liberalization: Lessons from Thailand 
Thailand is one of 160 countries that are currently 
members of WTO. There were several policy reasons 
for Thailand to join the multilateral trade 
organization. First, accession to the WTO would 
enhance trade security, transparency, and 
predictability under WTO rules. Since, the Thai 
economy is heavily dependent on exports, it was 
believed that Thailand’s exported products would 
benefit from the multilateral rules which oblige 
member countries to reduce custom duty and tariffs 
on an equal basis under the Most-Favoured-Nation 
(MFN) and the National Treatment (NT) principles. 
Secondly, as a WTO member, Thailand would be in a 
better position to seek the best possible negotiation on 
trade-related issues in its own interests. It would have 
an opportunity to participate in negotiations for 
international rules relating to health, quality, safety, or 
environmental standards under WTO Agreements, 
such as, Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT) and Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS), which would guarantee continued 
access to foreign export markets. Thirdly, the WTO 
membership would create new trade and investment 
opportunities for Thailand, and would strengthen 
multilateral trade collaborations with other countries. 
Contrary to industrial and government belief 
regarding the perceived benefits of free trade, there is 
widespread scepticism amongst consumer and civic 
groups in Thailand over its adverse consequences. 
The civil society believes that trade liberalization is 
politically driven. They claim that accession to the 
WTO and signing free trade agreements could have 
constraining effects on Thailand’s policy space for 
industrial development. It would also increase 
administrative burdens, restricting domestic 
regulatory policies, etc. As far as trade in goods is 
concerned, Thailand, being a member of the WTO, 
has commitments to gradually reduce the tariff rates 
on certain industrial and agricultural products, and to 
convert existing non-tariff measures (e.g. quotas and 
other quantitative restrictions) to tariffs on certain 
agricultural goods such as rice, corn, soybean, sugar, 
garlic, etc. The reduction of tariffs will lead to an 
influx of cheap, subsidized agricultural products into 
Thailand harming the interest of farmers who are the 
producers for the domestic market. 
With regard to foreign investment and trade in 
services, Thailand has reformed its laws and 
regulations to comply with the Agreement on  
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) of the 
WTO, which provides that WTO members may apply 
certain investment measures, such as performance and 
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local content requirements, but such measures must 
not become barriers to trade or distort trade. WTO 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) does not 
oblige member states to liberalize their service market 
but to enter into negotiations with a view to liberalize 
service trade under the principle of progressive 
liberalization. Thailand has so far made commitments 
with respect to financial services, banking and 
insurance, and started liberalizing and amending the 
laws relating to those service sectors. 
As far as the protection of IP rights is concerned, 
WTO/TRIPS Agreement requires significant reform 
of laws in many areas, along with substantially 
eliminating infringing activities of IP rights.11 Like 
many other developing countries, Thailand had made 
great strides, before and after it became a member of 
the WTO, responding to unilateral demands from the 
United States. In 1989 and 1991, prior to the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round of GATT talks, 
Thailand amended the laws to protect pharmaceutical 
patents, trademark and copyright protection of non-
traditional subject matters, geographical indications, 
trade secret and layout-designs of integrated circuit.12 
The Thai government also made a lot of efforts to 
enforce the IP laws more vigourously. A number of 
cases of copyright and trademark infringement were 
successfully prosecuted, and the average penalties for 
such illegal practices have substantially increased. 
The increased level of IP protection has allowed 
patent holders to charge excessive price for their 
products.13 Particularly, the increased level of 
protection of pharmaceutical patents has directly and 
indirectly increased the cost of medicines and 
restricting generic companies’ ability to compete, thus 
obstructing the country’s accessibility to essential 
medicines. In addition, the lack of institutional 
capacity for the rigorous assessment of the 
patentability requirements has led to the practice 
called ‘patent-evergreening’, thereby exacerbating the 
access-to-medicine problem.14 The ‘patent-
evergreening’ refers to the strategy and practice 
employed by pharmaceutical companies to extend the 
length of their monopoly beyond the life of the 
original patent. For example, companies could file 
and obtain patents on new formulations, new 
combinations, new indications, new dosages or new 
usages of the original compound by claiming that the 
improvement would provide improved therapeutic 
value (e.g. being more effective against the disease 
with fewer side-effects than the original drug). This is 
so despite the fact that the new forms of the drug may 
offer little or no advantage over existing medicines.15 
Patents on a minor, incremental innovation can have a 
dramatic impact on access to medicines when they are 
used to block affordable generic products. 
Thailand’s experience with trying to provide access 
to drugs to its poor population highlights the 
difficulties the country faces when it has adopted 
strong IP laws but struggles to improve its capacity to 
implement such laws. In November 2006 and January 
2007, the Thai Ministry of Public Health issued 
licences against patents over three medicines: (1) 
Efavirenz, Merck’s anti-HIV drug (branded 
‘Stocrin’); (2) Lopinavir/Ritonavir (branded 
‘Kaletra’), an ARV distributed by Abbott 
Laboratories; and (3) Clopidogrel (‘Plavix’), an anti-
clotting drug sold by Sanofi-Aventis and Bristol-
Myers Squibb. In fact, the patents for these drugs 
should not have been granted in the first place as 
some of these drugs do not meet the requirements for 
patentability. Lopinavir/Ritonavir or ‘Kaletra’ is a 
mere combination of two existing products, which 
should not be considered patentable “as it does not 
show a new and non-obvious synergistic effect”.16 
The patent on Clopidogrel or ‘Plavix’ is a 
composition of matter patent, which claims over the 
hydrogen sulfate salt of Clopidogrel or a polymorph. 
This form of invention would probably not be deemed 
a patentable invention because ‘polymorphs are not 
invented but constitute an inherent property of 
chemical compounds’. In addition, the polymorph 
claim should not be considered as involving an 
inventive step as it is ‘obvious for a pharmaceutical 
manufacturer to find the most suitable polymorph for 
any particular drug’.17 Unlike many developed 
countries, Thailand is unable to develop an efficient 
patent system. The Thai patent office does not possess 
sufficient capability to thoroughly conduct a proper 
substantial examination of patent applications.18 If the 
Thai patent office had the capability to properly test 
the novelty and inventive step requirements, there 
would be no need for the Thai government to grant a 
compulsory licence in order to improve access to 
medicines for its population. 
In regard to the protection of plant varieties, 
Thailand has implemented Article 27.3(b) of the 
TRIPS Agreement by adopting a sui generis law. The 
Plant Variety Protection Act B.E. 2542 provides 
protection for not only new varieties of plants but also 
traditional varieties, local domestic varieties and wild 
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plant varieties. Under the current legal framework, 
Thailand can adapt and change the plant variety 
protection system to suit the local conditions in its 
agriculture and farming sectors. The developed 
countries have attempted, through bilateral trade 
negotiations, to limit this flexibility the country 
currently enjoys by requiring Thailand to implement 
the UPOV 1991 Act. The UPOV system will leave 
Thailand with few options regarding the scope of 
protection, as the 1991 Act provides the least 
discretion to the signatory states in choosing how to 
protect plant varieties. 
According to Article 14 of the 1991 Act, the 
protection must be extended to all plant varieties. The 
exclusive rights must cover vegetative or reproductive 
propagating material, and extend to essentially 
derived varieties and harvested material. The rights of 
farmers to save, use, exchange, or sell farm-saved 
seeds are constrained. The full-scale monopoly rights 
will adversely affect the food and agricultural sectors, 
and adversely affect the interests of poor farmers, in 
particular when their right to save seeds is removed. 
Moreover, the accession to UPOV 1991 will prohibit 
the inclusion of provisions, which are currently 
enshrined under the plant variety protection law of 
Thailand, requiring applicants to prove that a plant 
variety is safe and does not cause any harmful effects 
to the environment.19 
From the foregoing, it may be observed that while 
the strengthening of IP protection in the developed 
countries has been taken place in the context of legal 
systems with a solid tradition in the area of 
competition law and consumer protection,20 in 
Thailand, as in many other developing countries, the 
laws protecting consumers and regulating competition 
in the market are extremely weak. The right holders 
are free to increase the price of the products protected 
by IP rights as they wish. The excessive and 
unregulated power given by IP rights have 
unnecessarily placed an additional burden on society 
and deprived the people right of access to essential 
products as Thailand’s experience has shown. In 
addition, the policy of Thailand generally views trade 
liberalization as an end in itself, rather than as a 
mechanism that helps the country to achieve its 
national development goals. As a result, the country 
has paid very little attention to issues of how to 
improve its capacity for trade negotiations and how to 
promote a systematic development of the institutional 
capacity in order to efficiently implement the 
obligations it has under international trade agreements. 
Non-Transparency in Trade Negotiations 
While the 1980s and 1990s witnessed regime 
shifting for the intellectual property issue such as the 
move from WIPO to GATT/WTO, the 2000s has seen 
effort of some developed countries, particularly the 
United States and the European Union, to move 
intellectual property negotiations from the multilateral 
WTO system to regional and bilateral regimes. While 
negotiating a free trade agreement (FTA) with 
different countries, the US and the EU have requested 
their trade partners to provide more stringent 
intellectual property regimes than what is required in 
TRIPS (the so-called ‘TRIPS-Plus’), in exchange for 
greater access for those countries’ exports to US and 
EU markets. The United States, which is a major 
player in FTA negotiation, has so far signed 20 
bilateral agreements with other countries. The first 
post-WTO FTA was the agreement the United States 
signed with Jordan in 2001. The most recent is the 
US-Korea FTA, which was signed in 2011. Most US 
FTAs contain similar provisions, which set out 
commitments beyond those currently established 
under WTO agreements. The rules and standards 
established by the bilateral and regional trade 
agreements will eventually serve as a model for 
expanding stronger trade commitments at the 
multilateral level.21 
On patents and pharmaceuticals, US FTAs 
generally contain a chapter that provides for strong 
patent protection, which includes at least five key 
areas: (1) extension of patent coverage and restriction 
of the grounds for exclusion of patentability; (2) 
restraint of the use of compulsory licenses; (3) 
extension of patent term to compensate for 
unreasonable delays in granting the patent or for 
unreasonable curtailment of the patent term as a result 
of the marketing approval process; (4) accession to 
the Patent Cooperation Treaty; and (5) the provision 
of exclusivity protection for test and other relevant 
data submitted for market approval. Some of these 
provisions may have negative consequences for 
public health.23 The TRIPS-plus provisions that the 
US have signed with its trade partners have 
introduced language that would make the compulsory 
licensing provisions difficult to apply, as it sets more 
stringent conditions than the TRIPS standards. The 
FTA between the US and Singapore, for example, 
confines circumstances under which compulsory 
licenses may be issued to three circumstances  
only, namely (1) to remedy anti-competitive practices, 
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(2) in the case of public non-commercial use, and (3) 
in the case of national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency.24 It also prevents 
the country from issuing compulsory licenses in 
circumstances other than those mentioned above. For 
example, issuing a compulsory license on the ground 
of non-working or insufficient working of patents is 
prohibited, despite the fact that the use of compulsory 
licenses for local working of patents is the 
cornerstone of most countries’ patent law and 
explicitly enshrined in the Paris Convention. 
In addition, the US-Singapore FTA provides that a 
compulsory license may be issued to remedy an anti-
competitive practice only after the patent holder has 
been adjudged by judicial or administrative process, 
under the competition law, as carrying out an anti-
competitive practice.25 This requirement would render 
compulsory licensing practically unworkable against 
anti-competitive behaviours, as the patent holders can 
challenge directly sovereign conducts that injures 
them, through judiciary or administrative channels. In 
practice, the countries that intended to use the 
compulsory licensing have always been under 
considerable economic pressure. With the adoption of 
the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, it 
now seems obvious that WTO member countries can 
legitimately employ this legal mechanism to improve 
access to medicines. Since the TRIPS-plus 
commitments will further strengthen and prolong the 
patent monopoly, and contain ineffective provisions 
on compulsory licensing, revocation of patents and 
parallel import, the developing nations will have little 
room to make adjustments in the law to suit their 
particular needs. 
It should be noted that the comprehensive 
understanding of the actual implications of  
non-multilateral trade agreements is generally lacking 
among the general public. This is largely because 
those trade agreements are negotiated in secret, 
behind closed doors. The FTA negotiating process of 
the US and the EU has been criticized for lacking 
openness and transparency. The trade negotiators of 
these two economic superpowers are mandated to 
negotiate trade deals in secret. They usually demand 
for a closed and secretive bilateral trade negotiation 
from their negotiating partners. Public access to draft 
agreement texts and other documents is restricted 
throughout the negotiation process. American and 
European public do not have knowledge about the 
details of the negotiations and are not aware of the 
proposals made by their government. 
It may be noted that the United States uses a 
confidential trade advisory committee system, which 
consists of 28 trade advisory committees. These 
committees are largely dominated by industries. For 
example, the members of the Trade Advisory 
Committee on intellectual property rights are mostly 
the representatives of US major research-based 
pharmaceutical companies and entertainment 
industry. They are the only interested private parties 
that are allowed to access to and contribute comments 
on US proposals on IP matters.25 The information that 
has been made publicly available is generally one-side 
information, coming mainly from the government and 
those private groups. Public demands in the United 
States have called for a system of transparency, 
collaboration and participation of broader interest 
groups in this public policy making. It was claimed 
that the closed-door policy not only prevented the vast 
majority of the public from fully comprehending the 
content of the negotiations, but also denied trade 
negotiators the opportunity to listen and exchange 
views with the public members.26 
The secret nature of the bilateral and regional 
negotiations is contrary to the more open and 
transparent practice adopted by the WTO and the 
WIPO in their multilateral negotiations. The two 
organizations generally make all country proposals 
available to the public as a formal part of the 
negotiation process. They from time to time  
publish updates on the status of negotiations  
that generates public debates regarding various 
aspects of the negotiated issues. Major developed 
countries are dissatisfied with the transparency in the 
norm-making process of the multilateral 
organizations. It was perhaps one of the reasons why 
those countries have shifted their policy towards 
pursuing bilateral trade.  
The secrecy in trade negotiations allows the 
developed countries to establish acceptable higher 
trade standards. It also helps them to escape social 
movement attention and to avoid growing public 
opposition against international norm-making at the 
multilateral level.27 As pointed out by Flynn et al., 
‘[T]he strategy appeared tailored to avoid an open 
debate over the standards being proposed in the 
agreement’.28 The United States and the European 
Union are pushing for poor countries to accept trade 
issues that will have public interest implications, such 
as, threatening access to affordable generic medicines 
or generating environmental and resource depletion 
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effects. It is probably the main reason why US and 
EU trade negotiators are reluctant to reveal its 
negotiating position to the public.29 
In Thailand, the trade liberalization policy of the 
government has been subject to domestic criticisms 
for lack of transparency and for its unequal 
distribution of benefits between different interest 
groups. Like the US and the EU, Thailand generally 
carries out trade negotiations in secrecy. While the 
Thai government grants corporate lobby groups 
privileged access to its policy-making, it does not 
provide adequate avenues for consultation and 
participation of public-interest civil-society groups or 
stakeholders that would be highly affected by the 
proposed agreements. For example, it has never 
allowed civic groups, such as environmental, human 
rights and development organizations, NGOs working 
on HIV/AIDS, generic drug companies, farmer 
organisations, consumer associations and labour 
unions, to participate in formal and informal 
consultation meetings to which business people and 
trade councils are invited. Therefore, issues and 
proposals put forward for negotiation by Thailand are 
not carefully scrutinized by the potentially affected 
parties, and the decisions made by the government 
tend to be biased against grass roots and broader 
public interests.30 
There is also a lack of official information about 
what the potential effects of the trade agreements. The 
Thai government has not provided access to the draft 
negotiating texts in all relevant sectors, which creates 
difficulties for people to assess the impacts of the 
negotiations. Thailand’s trading partners, particularly 
the United States and the European Union, usually 
demand the Thai government to keep the process of 
negotiation secret. An official negotiator attached to 
the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs publicly admitted 
that the Thai chief negotiator was requested by US 
trade negotiators to sign a confidential agreement 
prior to conducting FTA negotiations between the two 
countries.31 
The non-transparency of trade negotiations was 
also reaffirmed by the Thai Senate Standing 
Committee on Foreign Affairs Economic, 
Commercial and Industrial Affairs. The Senate 
Committee conducted studies in regards to the 
impacts of trade liberalization and free trade 
agreements and in its report raised concerns over the 
non-transparent nature of the negotiations.32 In 
addition to negotiating in secrecy, the Thai 
government always undertakes negotiations in a hasty 
manner without any clear view regarding the long-
term impact of trade liberalization. Thailand’s 
negotiating positions are largely determined based on 
an assessment of the competitiveness of the relevant 
sectors. No studies have been conducted by the Thai 
government about the social, cultural and 
environmental effects of free trade agreements. As a 
result, there is no clear governmental policy as to how 
the adverse effects of trade liberalization could be 
mitigated or lessened.  
 
Thailand Advancing Transparency in Trade 
Negotiations 
Currently, Thailand has been regarded an emerging 
economy, with solid growth during 2000 to 2012 
averaging more than 4 % per year. In 2010, Thailand 
enjoyed total gross domestic product (GDP) of US$ 
580.3 billion. It is presently ASEAN’s second largest 
economy after Indonesia. It has the fourth highest per 
capita GDP in ASEAN after Singapore, Brunei and 
Malaysia. Agriculture makes up 10.4 % of the 
country’s GDP, industry 45.6 % and services 44 %. 
Thailand’s major trading partners are the United 
States (10.9%), China (10.6%), and Japan (10.3%). 
The European Union, other ASEAN countries, 
Australia and New Zealand are also significant 
trading partners. Thailand has always enjoyed a 
substantial trade surplus. As the 2010 figure shows, 
its exports were worth US$ 191.3 billion and imports 
were US$ 156.9 billion. Primary destinations for Thai 
exports include the United States (10.9%), China 
(10.6%) and Japan (10.3%), and the major import 
partners are: Japan (18.7%), China (12.7%), Malaysia 
(6.4%), the United States (6.3%), United Arab 
Emirates (5%), Singapore (4.3%) and South Korea 
(4.1%).33 
Although the processes of globalization and trade 
liberalization have had a significant influence on 
Thailand’s economic policy, recent years have seen a 
steep increase in the number of non-state actors or 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Along with 
the rapid growth of the national economy, there has 
been a rise in the concept of social and public interest 
and the increasing growth of NGO works in a wide 
range of political, social, economic and 
developmental issues.34 NGOs represent the citizens’ 
interests by building public participation and 
monitoring government projects. They have so far 
been very critical of the way the national development 
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and decision-making processes are made, particularly 
under the influence of corporate-led trade 
liberalization. Some NGOs in Thailand have focussed 
their works on the country’s policy and positions in 
international trade negotiations. For example, they 
pressurized the Thai government to make use of the 
exception clause under Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS 
Agreement that allows for the exclusion of animals, 
plants and biological processes from patentability. 
They successfully put pressure on the Department of 
Intellectual Property, that administrates the patent 
office, to not authorize patentability of transgenic 
animals or plants. The NGOs also exerted pressure on 
the government to support the international regime on 
access and benefit sharing of genetic resources 
proposed by a group of developing countries led by 
India and Brazil in the WTO. In its submission to 
WTO, Thailand supported the demand for an 
amendment to Article 29 of TRIPS that will 
incorporate into the TRIPS Agreement the principles 
of mandatory disclosure of origin, benefit sharing and 
prior informed consent. The Thai NGOs also had 
influence on Thailand’s position on the protection of 
geographical indications. When negotiating on the 
WTO/TRIPS Agreement on protection of 
geographical indications, Thailand supported the 
extension of GI protection to other products than 
wines and spirits, due to the demand made by its civil-
society groups. 
In response to the plethora of non-multilateral trade 
agreements, an NGO group, called FTA Watch, was 
established in 2003. The group comprises academics, 
lawyers, environmentalists, social activists, trade 
unions, and other interest groups such as, the 
Alternative Agriculture Network, Thai Network of 
People Living with HIV/AIDS, and the Consumer 
Network amongst others. This group staged mass 
demonstrations against FTA negotiations between 
Thailand and its trading partners. They claimed that 
FTAs would generate socio-economic impacts on 
Thailand and demanded the Thai government to 
provide public access to information about the trade 
negotiations. Daniel Robinson of the University of 
New South Wales, who has spent many years 
observing the activities of Thailand’s NGOs, pointed 
out that the Thai NGO network on FTAs is well-
coordinated and has three primary activities: (1) 
advocacy work, (2) civic education, and (3) political 
lobbying.35 The FTA-Watch group has done a 
successful job in raising public awareness regarding 
to the implications of bilateral and regional trade 
negotiations. Because of their education campaign, 
the Thai public has increased understanding and 
concern about the consequences of liberalized trade 
and the development impact of the FTAs. 
The political, social, economic, judicial and 
regulatory systems in Thailand were subjected to a 
substantial reorganization when the Constitution of 
the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2540 was promulgated 
in 1997. It was called the ‘People’s Constitution’ as it 
was the first to be written by the assembly that was 
elected by popular vote.36 The People’s Constitution 
was introduced due to the political crisis in 1992 
when the military-supported prime minister was 
forced to resign after the army suppressed a middle-
class uprising. The incident led to a vigorous 
campaign for political reform and drafting a new 
constitution. Several NGO leaders were elected to the 
Constitution Drafting Assembly. They proposed 
constitutional requirements that promoted basic 
human rights, social welfare, educational 
opportunities, etc. The NGOs also made submissions 
addressing development issues, including 
environmental protection, land distribution, 
government support for agricultural production and 
distribution, and the community rights to manage 
natural resources.37 When a military coup d’etat was 
staged against the government of Thaksin Shinawatra 
on 19 September 2006, the Constitution was revoked. 
Although the People’s Constitution was short-lived, it 
was considered the best constitution Thailand ever 
had, particularly when it laid down the criteria for 
transparency in trade negotiations. 
The People’s Constitution introduced checks and 
balances into the country’s treaty-making system. 
Although the power to enter into treaties such as 
multilateral and non-multilateral trade agreements 
was vested in the government, the government was 
required to provide the public with access to the 
details of the negotiated treaty, prior to entering into 
negotiation. The government had to make available 
information relating to such a treaty and seek public 
opinions regarding the pros and cons of signing the 
treaty. It was also required to seek parliamentary 
approval for the treaty framework before it 
commenced the negotiation. After the treaty was 
concluded and the government had signed it, the 
treaty must be proposed for ratification by the Thai 
parliament in order to put it into force. The 
government must follow the aforementioned 
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procedures if the treaty negotiated falls into one of the 
following categories: (1) providing for a change in the 
national territories or the external territories that 
Thailand has sovereignty or jurisdiction over;  
(2) requiring a legislative enactment implementing the 
treaty; (3) having significant impact on Thailand’s 
economic or social security; (4) having significant 
impact on trade and investment in the country. 
Finally, when the treaty that Thailand ratified would 
have major impacts and the potential to affect certain 
sectors, the government was required to provide 
remedies to those affected by the treaty in an 
expeditious, suitable, and fair manner. 
 
Appraisal 
At the early stage of Thailand’s national 
development, public participation was not part of the 
planning and decision-making processes. Political 
power was controlled by State officials and the 
middle-class elites. External factors like globalisation 
and internationalisation have affected the county’s 
decision-making and implementation on new 
development policies. However, since the political 
changes towards democracy in the late 1970s, the 
Thai government authorities have come to realise  
the significance of public participation in the  
national development process, and have included a 
cross section of civic groups in policy process.  
The appearance of the civil society sector has  
been one of the most striking political events in 
Thailand. It reflects not only the increased concern 
about the globalisation and its impacts on the 
economy, but also a transformation in Thailand’s 
political economy which brought civic organisations 
and people networks closer together to represent rural 
demands. 
Recently, governments of the developed countries 
have been under increasing pressure from their 
domestic industries to raise the standards of protection 
in foreign countries. The successful conclusion of the 
TRIPS Agreement has established a new era of 
intellectual property protection with multilateral rules 
and obligations that all WTO members must 
implement. But TRIPS is not the end of the patent 
harmonization saga. Developed countries and their 
allies are currently shifting negotiations seeking 
further harmonization outside WTO in bilateral, 
regional, and multilateral agreements. They have 
pushed for harmonization of patents towards the 
developed countries’ model with the rules developed 
in their own countries, such as the novelty and the 
inventive step requirements, and moved towards 
patent examination, and the weakening of provisions 
for compulsory licenses and working requirements. 
While these harmonized rules impose strong patent 
policies in a manner that is designed to protect 
developed countries’ domestic industries, they may 
not suit the need to promote social welfare in 
developing countries. 
The main feature of recent non-multilateral norm-
setting activities under bilateral and regional trade 
agreements seems to be a complete lack of 
transparency during negotiations. Political power in 
negotiating such treaties has been in controlled by 
government officials and the TNCs. For the 
developing countries, external factors like the 
pressure exerted by their developed countries 
counterparts have significant influences on the way 
those countries conduct negotiations on a trade 
agreement. The movements of the civil society in 
Thailand are a classic civil struggle over the public’s 
right to receive information. It also shows that the 
severe social and economic impacts resulting from the 
government processes, together with a growing public 
discontent with the lack of transparency and 
participation, could consolidate the people struggle 
for the right to know about the activities of their 
government.  
If trade liberalization is to be a success leading to 
sustainable economic growth and ensuring the  
well-being of people, governments participating in 
trade negotiations have to decentralize their policy 
making by allowing public participation in the 
negotiating process. The following strategies should 
be taken in order to improve transparency:  
(1) providing the necessary means for various interest 
groups to become acquainted with international rules 
and norm setting procedures; (2) providing forums for 
public debate; (3) producing credible, objective policy 
studies; (4) making available to the public without 
delay draft agreements, policy documents, 
regulations, procedures and administrative rules of 
general application; (5) providing channels and 
opportunities for various parties to make observations 
and submissions about the trade issues that their 
government is involved in negotiations. Finally, the 
national constitution must provide for the parliament 
to have full power not only to make treaties but also 
to scrutinize socio-economic and other impacts of 
international trade agreements. 
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